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FACING REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION IN 
MOBILE APPS & WEARABLE COMPUTERS 
Yana Welinder† 
Abstract 
The use of face recognition technology in mobile apps and 
wearable computers challenges individuals’ ability to remain 
anonymous in public places.  These apps can also link individuals’ 
offline activities to their online profiles, generating a digital paper 
trail of their every move.  The ability to go off the radar allows for 
quiet reflection and daring experimentation—processes that are 
essential to a productive and democratic society.  Given what we 
stand to lose, we ought to be cautious with groundbreaking 
technological progress.  It does not mean that we have to move any 
slower, but we should think about potential consequences of the steps 
that we take. 
This article maps out the recently launched face recognition 
apps and some emerging regulatory responses to offer initial policy 
considerations.  With respect to current apps, app developers should 
consider how the relevant individuals could be put on notice given 
that the apps will not only be using information about their users, but 
also about the persons being identified.  They should also consider 
how the apps could minimize their data collection and retention and 
keep the data secure.  Today’s face recognition apps mostly use 
photos from social networks.  They therefore call for regulatory 
responses that consider the context in which users originally shared 
the photos.  Most importantly, the article highlights that the Federal 
Trade Commission’s first policy response to consumer applications 
that use face recognition did not follow the well-established principle 
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of technology neutrality.  The article argues that any regulation with 
respect to identification in real time should be technology neutral and 
narrowly address harmful uses of computer vision without hampering 
the development of useful applications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a thrilling scene in the computer-animated film The 
Incredibles, Mr. Incredible stumbles upon a tablet-like device.  The 
device scans his face with a camera, identifies him as Mr. Incredible, 
and proceeds with telling him a classified message before it self-
destructs.  Is this technology something you would only see in a 
fiction cartoon about superheroes?  As it happens, it is neither 
imaginary nor sci-fi.  In fact, a mobile application with similar 
functionality can today be downloaded instantly to your smartphone 
for $1.99—save the self-destruction.1 
But while we may observe some mobile applications of face 
recognition technology crop up in the iTunes store and elsewhere, this 
technology is still in its infancy.  Computer scientists have been 
working on face recognition technology for decades, but the 
technology has only recently been implemented in consumer 
applications.  These applications leverage the vast amount of labeled 
photos aggregated in social networks and the users’ oblivious 
keenness to teach algorithms how to recognize their friends.  The 
ubiquity of mobile phones with built-in cameras presents a new 
opportunity for this technology.  For now, face recognition with 
mobile phones requires fast Internet connection to communicate with 
servers that can store all the data about faces and process the 
information.
2
  But this too is now being enabled through rapid 
progress in mobile Internet speeds and the deployment of 4G mobile 
broadband.
3
 
The use of face recognition technology in mobile apps 
challenges individuals’ ability to remain anonymous in public places.  
These apps—in their current iteration—encourage users to upload 
photos with identified faces to social networks, along with embedded 
metadata revealing where and when they were captured.  
Consequently, when uploaded, the labeled images generate a digital 
 
 1. See FaceLook Face Recognition Lite, ITUNES, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelook-face-recognition/id512967999?mt=8 (last visited Dec. 
8, 2012). 
 2. Moore’s law predicts that the number of components on integrated circuits will 
double every two years and so eventually phones may have sufficient memory capacity and 
processing power to perform face recognition of a large number of individuals locally on the 
phones.  See Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, INTEL 1 (2005). 
 3. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND 
PLAN 22 (2010), available at http://www.broadband.gov/plan/ (describing the upgrade to 4G 
mobile networks). 
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paper trail of the individuals’ location in the photo.  The apps have 
this effect without seeking the consent of the identified individuals, 
who will not have seen the privacy notice displayed when an app was 
downloaded, and may not even know that they were photographed or 
identified.  In essence, this practice subjects individuals to a possible 
surveillance by their peers, employers, and companies that have an 
interest in their everyday choices, and perhaps even the government.  
The ability to go off the radar allows for quiet reflection and daring 
experimentation—processes that are essential to a productive and 
democratic society.
4
  In the words of privacy scholar Julie Cohen, 
“citizens who are subject to pervasively distributed surveillance and 
modulation by powerful commercial and political 
interests . . . increasingly will lack the capacity to form and pursue 
meaningful agendas for human flourishing.”5  Given what we stand to 
lose, we ought to be cautious with groundbreaking technological 
progress.  It does not mean that we have to move any slower, but we 
should think about potential consequences of the steps that we take.
6
 
This article maps out the recently launched real-time 
identification applications and some emerging regulatory responses to 
offer initial considerations for regulating this type of app.  With 
respect to current apps, app developers should consider how the 
relevant individuals could be put on notice given that the apps will not 
only be using information about their users, but also about the persons 
being identified.  They should also consider how the apps could 
minimize their data collection and retention and keep the data secure.  
Today’s real-time identification apps mostly use photos from social 
networks.  They therefore call for regulatory responses that consider 
the context in which users originally shared the photos.  Most 
importantly, I note that the FTC’s first policy response to consumer 
applications that use face recognition did not follow the well-
established principle of technology neutrality.  I argue that any 
regulation with respect to real-time identification should be 
technology neutral and narrowly address harmful uses of computer 
vision without hampering the development of useful applications. 
As such, Part I of this article broadly outlines how face 
 
 4. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 2), available at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/symposium/papers2012/cohen.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 
2013). 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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recognition technology works and presents a few early examples of 
how it has been implemented in real-time identification apps.  Part II 
explores the privacy implications of these apps.  To provide some 
policy context, this Part also compares the real-time identification 
apps to mobile apps that use geolocation data, which has been a 
recent concern for privacy advocates.  Part III reviews two broader 
regulatory responses to face recognition technology in the United 
States and Europe to identify some principles that may pertain to real-
time identification.  Finally, Part IV offers five initial principles to 
consider when regulating these apps in order to protect both 
fundamental privacy interests and innovation. 
I. REAL-TIME FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY USING PHONES 
(AND GLASSES) 
A. The Process of Automatic Face Recognition in Real Time 
Disruptive and highly visible uses of technology sometimes 
prompt hurried and overbroad policy responses.  The recent 
implementation of face recognition technology in mobile apps and 
social networks are but two applications of a field that has been 
developing for decades but may not yet have realized its full potential.  
As I discuss in Part IV below, it is therefore important to formulate 
policy that narrowly targets particular uses of face recognition 
without impacting the development of the technology.  To appreciate 
the limited role of the recent consumer applications of face 
recognition technology, it is helpful to briefly review the history of 
the development and application of face recognition techniques. 
Computer scientists have long been captivated by the possibility 
of getting computers to recognize faces.  When recognizing a 
person’s face, you need not solicit interaction by asking for a name or 
taking a fingerprint.
7
  Though perhaps less precise, face recognition 
technology is certainly more convenient than many other types of 
biometric recognition that require individuals to consciously submit to 
the recognition process.
8
  But more importantly, face recognition is 
the main process by which humans recognize each other.
9
  And so this 
research problem presents one piece of the puzzle to get computers to 
simulate—or even excel at—human vision and, more broadly, the 
 
 7. Tanzeem Choudhury, History of Face Recognition, MIT MEDIA LAB (Jan. 21, 2000), 
http://vismod.media.mit.edu/tech-reports/TR-516/node7.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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quest for artificial intelligence. 
In 1973, Takeo Kanade published his PhD thesis at Kyoto 
University in Japan, outlining one of the earliest face recognition 
technologies.
10
  While Kanade’s work was revolutionary, the 
technology did not really take off until 1991, when Matthew Turk and 
Alex Pentland presented a method for distinguishing faces from 
crowded environments.
11
  This was the beginning of real-time 
identification, but the technology has gone a long way since.
12
 
Today’s face recognition methods generally begin with an 
analysis of “training images” of already known individuals to 
measure their facial features.
13
  The measurements, also known as 
“biometric data,” are collected into a biometric database.14  Once a 
biometric database is compiled, face recognition technology can use it 
to recognize the listed individuals in new photos.
15
  This, of course, 
means that the person using the technology and the database does not 
need to know anything about the listed individuals to be able to 
recognize them.  The user only needs to upload a photo to a computer 
or web application that uses the technology and has access to the 
database.
16
  The technology then tries to detect a face in the new 
photo.
17
  If it finds a face, the technology transforms its size, position, 
illumination, and color-scale so that it can be compared to biometric 
data gathered under other conditions.
18
  In other words, it normalizes 
the photo.
19
  Finally, it measures the facial features in the normalized 
photo and compares them against the measurements in the biometric 
database to determine if the face corresponds to one of the listed 
 
 10. HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 1 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2d ed. 2011) 
(citing Takeo Kanade, Picture Processing by Computer Complex and Recognition of Human 
Faces (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kyoto University)). 
 11. Choudhury, supra note 7. 
 12. Choudhury, supra note 7. 
 13. See HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 2-3 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 1st ed. 
2005). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Party 29 Opinion on  Facial 
Recognition in Online and Mobile Service, 2012 00727/12 (WP 192) (EN), 2012 O.J. (L 727) 2 
(EN) [hereinafter WP29 Opinion], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp192_en.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 17. See HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
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individuals.
20
  As researchers perfected this process, face recognition 
technology began cropping up in consumer applications such as 
iPhoto, Picasa, Facebook, Google Plus, and Microsoft’s Kinect 
gaming device.
21
 
The availability of ubiquitous camera phones with fast Internet 
connection means that this process can also be performed directly via 
a mobile app.  This eliminates the delay of having to upload a photo 
to a computer or web application.  A camera phone user can simply 
snap a picture of an anonymous face and instantly get information 
about that individual on the phone screen in real-time.  The 
photographed individual would likely not even realize that she was 
being automatically identified.
22
  Today, it has become so common to 
take photos of food and other mundane things that it is virtually 
impossible to figure out when a stranger is trying to take a photo of 
your face.
23
  Secret photographing will further be facilitated by 
wearable computers, which will incorporate the functionalities of 
smartphones into head mounted displays. 
24
 
B. Early Applications of Real-Time Identification 
In 2011, a research team at Carnegie Mellon University showed 
that publicly available face recognition technology (which was 
subsequently acquired by Google) could be applied to Facebook 
photos to identify college students on a campus with a 31.18 percent 
success rate in only a few seconds.
25
  Various mobile apps have 
similarly tapped into Facebook’s vast photo database to recognize 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of 
Augmented Reality, BLACK HAT WEBCAST 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-Webinar-2012-out.pdf; Larry Magid, 
Google+ Adds Find My Face Feature, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2011/12/08/google-adds-find-my-face-feature/.  See 
also Douglas Gantenbein, Helping Kinect Recognize Faces, MICROSOFT RESEARCH (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/kinectfacereco-103111.aspx. 
 22. See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 1 (“images of an individual may be captured 
(with or without the individual being aware)”). 
 23. College humor has an excellent parody about this new trend to photograph 
everything. See Look at this Instagram, COLLEGE HUMOR (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.collegehumor.com/video/6853117/look-at-this-instagram-nickelback-parody. 
 24. See, e.g., Paul Miller, Project Glass and the Epic History of Wearable Computers, 
THE VERGE (June 26, 2012, 2:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/6/26/2986317/google-
project-glass-wearable-computers-disappoint-me.  See also infra Part I.C. 
 25. Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of Augmented 
Reality, BLACK HAT WEBCAST 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-Webinar-2012-out.pdf. 
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individuals in real-time.  In 2012, Face.com was offering an iPhone 
app called KLIK, which identified users’ Facebook friends in a photo 
while it was being taken.
26
  KLIK had serious security vulnerabilities 
and was discontinued as soon as Facebook acquired Face.com that 
same year.
27
  FaceLook is another app that uses Facebook photos to 
recognize faces with an iPhone in real time.
28
  Android users can do 
the same with Viewdle SocialCamera, which was acquired by 
Google’s Motorola Mobility in late 2012.29  Given the recent boom in 
face recognition technology, it should be no surprise that start-ups 
using the technology are hot acquisition targets for today’s tech 
giants.
30
 
Most of these apps allow users to upload photos to social 
networks after they automatically identify the photographed 
individuals.  Uploaded photos may include metadata about where the 
photo was taken.
31
  And even if the metadata could be scraped before 
it is shown to other social network users, the location of the photo 
may still be obvious from landmarks in the background.
32
  For 
 
 26. See David Goldman, Real-time Face Recognition Comes to Your iPhone Camera, 
CNN MONEY, Mar. 12, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/12/technology/iPhone-face-
recognition/index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
 27. See Ashkan Soltani, Facepalm, ASHKANSOLTANI (June 18, 2012), 
http://ashkansoltani.org/2012/06/18/facepalm/ (last visited Jul. 21, 2013) (“Face.com essentially 
allowed anyone to hijack a KLIK user’s Facebook and Twitter accounts to get access to photos 
and social graph (which enables ‘face prints’), even if that information isn’t public.” (emphasis 
in the original)); Steven Musil, Facebook Shuts Down Face.com APIs, Klik App, CNET NEWS 
(July 8, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57468247-93/facebook-shuts-
down-face.com-apis-klik-app/. 
 28. FaceLook Face Recognition Lite, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelook-
face-recognition/id512967999?mt=8. 
 29. See, e.g., Emily Steel, A Face Launches 1,000 Apps, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903885604576488273434534638.html?mod=
WSJ_Tech_LEFTTopNews; Viewdle, CRUNCHBASE,  
http://www.crunchbase.com/company/viewdle. 
 30. In addition to PittPatt and Viewdle, Google has also acquired Neven Vision, Riya, 
and Picasa.  Apple has acquired the Swedish face recognition company, Polar Rose.  See 
Alessandro Acquisti et al., Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age of Augmented Reality, BLACK 
HAT WEBCAST 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-
Webinar-2012-out.pdf. 
 31. See, e.g., Facebook Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It is Used, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#inforeceived (last visited Feb. 
8, 2012) (Facebook may get this information as a geotag uploaded with the photo, containing its 
exact latitude and longitude).  See also Kate Murphy, Web Photos That Reveal Secrets, Like 
Where You Live, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at B6. 
 32. See Vice.com Publishes Exclusive with John McAfee Reveals Location in iPhone 
Metadata (EXIF), MOBILE PRIVACY (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.mobileprivacy.org/2012/12/vice-com-publishes-exclusive-with-john-mcafee-
reveals-location-in-iphone-metadata-exif/; see also Hanni Fakhoury, A Picture is Worth a 
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example, other users can easily recognize that a person is in San 
Francisco if the Golden Gate Bridge is visible in the background.
33
  
Real-time identification apps thus create a record of location data both 
for the app users, who presumably were there to take the photo, and 
the photographed individuals. 
It should be noted that most of this process could of course be 
carried out without face recognition technology.  Users can manually 
tag photos and upload them to social networks, and there are apps that 
provide this very capability.
34
  But this would require users to actually 
know and be able to recognize the individual in question.  And users 
are more likely to exercise good judgment and be restrained by social 
norms when they upload photos of their friends.
35
  They are also more 
likely to know about their friends’ personal circumstances and have a 
sense for when uploading photos of them may be inappropriate.  
Finally, they are able to ask their friends for permission to post photos 
of them and more agreeable if a friend asks them to take down a 
photo. 
C. Cyborgs, Wearable Computers, and Augmented Reality 
While real-time identification apps in mobile phones can identify 
individuals without their knowledge, this concern will be exacerbated 
with the next wave of smart devices.  The development of wearable 
computers promises to augment human vision to make humans into 
cyborgs.  A cyborg or cybernetic organism—a concept thought up by 
Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960—refers to a human that 
 
Thousand Words, Including Your Location, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 20, 
2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/picture-worth-thousand-words-including-your-
location. 
 33. Fakhoury, supra note 32. 
 34. See, e.g., Facebook Camera, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facebook-
camera/id525898024?mt=8; see also Ingrid Lunden, Security Loophole in Facebook’s Camera 
App Allowed Hackers to Hijack Accounts Over WiFi [Confirmed], TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 24, 
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/24/security-loophole-in-facebooks-camera-app-allowed-
hackers-to-hijack-accounts-over-wifi/#comment-box. 
 35. But see Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and 
Design, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1008 (2012) (pointedly observing that “‘Facebook friends,’ 
are often not friends in the traditional sense.  As Danah Boyd explains, ‘[t]he term “friend” in 
the context of social network sites is not the same as in everyday vernacular.  And people know 
this . . . The term is terrible but it means something different on these sites; it’s not to anyone’s 
advantage to assume that the rules of friendship apply to Friendship.’  A tongue-in-cheek 
illustration of this point is offered by the ‘Whopper Sacrifice’ campaign that Burger King ran as 
a Facebook Platform application.  The campaign offered Facebook users who purged ten 
Facebook friends deemed unworthy of their weight in beef a coupon for a free Whopper.  
Burger King dispersed many coupons.”). 
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has been modified with technology to enhance her capabilities.
36
  For 
example, blind people can wear glasses that record their surrounding 
and represent it to them as noises through headphones.
37
  Another 
example is EyeTap, computer glasses famously worn by Steven 
Mann, which could be used to improve his night vision or to remove 
annoying advertising from his visual spectrum.
38
  Similarly, one could 
imagine glasses with face recognition technology and a connection to 
a biometric database, which could augment an individual.  She could, 
for example, automatically recall important details upon meeting an 
acquaintance, such as the name of his spouse or children, where he 
works, or whether he has some particular sensibilities that she may 
want to avoid in a conversation.  The general perception is that people 
who naturally possess the skill of paying attention to and 
remembering these details are generally well-liked and tend to fare 
better in personal and professional life.  It is easy to see how others 
would like to mimic that skill with technology.  Indeed, Steve Mann 
explained the value of his device as providing “an on-demand 
photographic memory [that] can help all of us by offloading, to a 
wearable computer, the task of memorizing now-mundane details that 
might only later become important.”39  Yet, his motive with wearing 
his EyeTap and logging his experiences in a video “lifeglog” seemed 
to be more a political statement in response increased surveillance by 
government and corporate entities.
40
  In his view, a personal 
“lifeglog” can counteract surveillance from the top with 
“sousveillance” from the bottom—from the perspective of individuals 
who are normally under surveillance by various authorities.
41
 
In addition to keeping track of acquaintances, a wearable 
computer with face recognition technology could also allow users to 
identify people that they do not yet know.  The person standing next 
 
 36. Manfred E. Clynes & Nathan S. Kline, Cyborgs and space, ASTRONAUTICS, Sept. 
1960 at 26, available at http://cyberneticzoo.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/cyborgs-
Astronautics-sep1960.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 37. See Augmented Reality for the Totally Blind, SEEING WITH SOUND, 
http://www.seeingwithsound.com/. 
 38. Jane Bailey & Ian Kerr, Seizing Control?: The Experience Capture Experiments of 
Ringley & Mann, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH., no. 2, 2007 at 129, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1303204 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); see 
also Steve Mann: My “Augmediated” Life, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2013, 2:17 PM), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/geek-life/profiles/steve-mann-my-augmediated-life. 
 39. Bailey & Kerr, supra note 38, at 129. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Ian Kerr & Steve Mann, Exploring Equiveillance, ON THE IDENTITY TRAIL (Jan. 3, 
2006, 11:07 PM), http://www.anonequity.org/weblog/archives/2006/01/exploring_equiv_1.php. 
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to you in line at the grocery store or a coffee shop may have the exact 
same interests as you and you may have incredibly compatible 
personalities.  Wouldn’t it be great if a pair of computer glasses could 
tell you this so that you could seize the day and make a new friend?  
This may now be closer to reality as consumer applications of 
wearable computing are being developed.  The most notable 
consumer product is Google’s Project Glass.42  The computer display 
manufacturer Vizux is developing a competitor with its Smart Glasses 
M100.
43
  While Google Glass and M100 have a futuristic design that 
is bound to attract a lot of attention if worn in public, the British 
Company TTP is developing a device that looks very much like 
ordinary black-framed glasses from the front.
44
  Less sleek than 
Google Glass, M100, and the TTP glasses, is the head-borne device 
HC1, developed by Motorola Solutions.
45
  Microsoft has also recently 
filed a patent application for “a head mounted display with 
supplemental information when viewing a live event.”46  While these 
 
 42. Glass, GOOGLE,  http://www.google.com/glass/start/; see also Details of Google’s 
Project Glass Revealed in FCC Report, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21290934. 
 43. Intelligent Hands-Free Display for Smartphones, VUZIX, 
http://www.vuzix.com/consumer/products_m100.html#overview (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see 
also Best Smart Glasses 2013, SQUIDOO, http://www.squidoo.com/best-smart-glasses (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 44. UK Company’s ‘Augmented Reality’ Glasses Could be Better than Google’s, THE 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-
news/uk-companys-augmented-reality-glasses-could-be-better-than-googles-20120911-
25pdn.html; see What Happens When You Walk into a Bar Wearing Google Glasses, ZOWCHOW 
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://zowchow.com/2013/02/01/what-happens-when-you-walk-into-a-bar-
wearing-google-glasses/ (describing how people are reacting to early adopters of Google Glass); 
see also Get Ready For Even More Google Glasshole Sightings, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/28/glassholes/. 
 45. Mark Gregory, Motorola Unveils a Computer That Straps onto Your Head, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20316589 (While this 
helmet-like device with an external snap-on camera will not easily melt into crowds, it is mainly 
intended for maintenance and construction work in locations that are difficult to reach with other 
computer equipment); see also HC1 Headset Computer, MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.motorola.com/Business/US-
EN/Business+Product+and+Services/Mobile+Computers/Wearable+Computers/HC1 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 46. U.S. Patent Application No. 13/112,919, Publication No. 20120293548 (filed May 
20, 2011), available at http://appft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.h
tml&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220120293548%22.PGNR.&OS=DN/20120293548&RS=DN/201
20293548; see also Alex Wilhelm, Microsoft’s Augmented-Reality Patent Could Square it Off 
Against Google’s ‘Glass’ Project, THE NEXT WEB (Nov. 24, 2012, 1:06 AM), 
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/11/24/microsofts-agumented-reality-patent-could-square-it-
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products take photos and can connect to the Internet, none of them are 
known to include face recognition technology at this point.
47
  As this 
article went to press, Google Glass face recognition and face 
classification applications were already being developed.
48
  In 
response to growing privacy concerns, Google issued a statement that 
it would not approve face recognition apps for Glass.
49
 
While face recognition technology in computer glasses can have 
many useful applications, it does raise the potential that individuals 
can be recognized instantly against their will and in situations when 
they prefer to remain anonymous.  In the case of Mann’s experiment 
with EyeTap, which displayed video recordings of people online and 
did not run face recognition technology on them, he relied on people’s 
ability to object to the recording.
50
  Ian Kerr has noted that even if 
Mann discussed the experiment with his subject before streaming it 
online, it would be difficult for them to comprehend the consequences 
of their consent.
51
  Moreover, the EyeTap transformed Mann’s 
appearance into a bionic man such that it would be difficult for a 
subject not to realize that she is being captured by a piece of 
technology while talking to him.
52
  By contrast, some of the 
technologies being developed today can be far more discrete.  If 
equipped with face recognition technology, these devices could 
record and automatically recognize individuals in public without as 
much as a sound or flash.
53
  The following discussion regarding real-
time identification apps in mobile phones applies equally to the 
 
 47. See, e.g., Intelligent Hands-Free Display for Smartphones, VUZIX, 
http://www.vuzix.com/consumer/products_m100.html#specifications (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 48. David Talbot, Google Irks Developers with Ruling on Facial-Recognition Apps, MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/515756/google-irks-
developers-with-ruling-on-facial-recognition-apps/ (last visited June 16, 2013); see also 
ReKognition APIs for Google Glass, ORBEUS, http://glass.rekognition.com/sdk/index.php (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 49. Jon Brodkin, Google Forbids Facial Recognition Apps on Glass in the Name of 
Privacy, ARS TECHNICA (June 3, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/06/google-forbids-facial-recognition-apps-on-glass-in-the-name-of-privacy/ 
(last visited June 16, 2013); see also Glass and Facial Recognition, Project Glass, GOOGLE 
PLUS (May 31, 2013), https://plus.google.com/u/0/+projectglass/posts/fAe5vo4ZEcE. 
 50. Bailey & Kerr, supra note 38, at 129. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Andy Greenberg, Cyborg Discrimination? Scientist Says McDonald’s Staff Tried To 
Pull Off His Google-Glass-Like Eyepiece, Then Threw Him Out, FORBES (July 17, 2012, 8:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/17/cyborg-discrimination-scientist-
says-mcdonalds-staff-tried-to-pull-off-his-google-glass-like-eyepiece-then-threw-him-out/. 
 53. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism In Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1037, n.54 (2012) (noting that Congress tried to recreate the shutter sound 
of analog cameras in camera phones with the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act of 2009). 
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potential use of computer glasses with face recognition technology. 
II. CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITIES (AND DIFFERENCES) BETWEEN 
REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION AND GEOLOCATION APPLICATIONS 
Real-time identification apps will challenge our fundamental 
privacy law framework of notice and consent in unprecedented ways.  
To show some of the issues they will raise, I compare them here to 
geolocation data in mobile apps.  Both are capable of determining a 
person’s location in real time.  But geolocation apps are also very 
different in that the person to whom the location data pertains could 
potentially have notice of the collection—albeit not a very effective 
notice—when downloading the app to her phone and later seeing the 
location symbol on the mobile screen when the app uses location 
data.
54
  By comparison, an individual whose face is recognized at a 
distance with a real-time identification app on another’s phone does 
not even have that luxury.  This makes it very difficult for real-time 
identification apps to seek meaningful consent of the affected 
individual.  Their data collection and processing is invisible by 
design.  In that sense, face recognition is also different from some 
other forms of biometric identification where you need to press your 
fingerprint or palm against a scanner, putting you on notice of the 
identification process. 
A. Location, Location, Location 
In 1996, the Federal Communication Commission issued an 
order requiring mobile service providers to design their services such 
that 911 emergency responders would be able to establish a caller’s 
location within a 125-meter radius.
55
  This was accomplished through 
determining the caller’s proximity to nearby cell towers.56  Today, the 
distance to cell towers can reveal a person’s location with 100 meters 
 
 54. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST 
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 17-18 (2013) [hereinafter FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (discussing how 
“Apple and Google utilize icons to signal to consumers when an app is accessing their 
geolocation information”). 
 55. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES TO ENSURE 
COMPATIBILITY WITH ENHANCED 911 EMERGENCY CALLING SYSTEM (1996), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1996/fcc96264.txt; see also HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL 
LIFE 24 (2009) [hereinafter NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT]. 
 56. See Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How it Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, 
TECHHIVE (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:45 PM), http://www.techhive.com/article/192803/geolo.html. 
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accuracy, but the location data is becoming more accurate as 
providers build new cell towers.
57
  Most mobile phones also contain 
GPS chips that calculate their coordinates based on information 
obtained from satellites.
58
  This method generally provides more 
accurate location data than the distance to cell towers and can now 
determine a person’s location with ten meters accuracy.59  Although 
often less accurate, the proximity to cell towers is still used to 
determine location when the GPS chip has bad satellite reception, 
which often is the case indoors.
60
 
Mobile apps use location data to, for example, help users 
navigating to a destination, to recommend nearby services, or to allow 
users to link up with friends that are nearby.
61
  Users often also self-
report their location online by manually “checking-in” at restaurants, 
airports, museums, and other establishments and posting their location 
to social networks.
62
  They do so to tell their friends about what they 
are up to or to unlock a virtual reward for having frequented a 
particular location.
63
 
While fun and often useful, geolocation data can also be 
collected and shared in undesirable ways.
64
  Unlike a desktop, or even 
 
 57. Nicole Ozer et al., Location-Based Services: Time for a Privacy Check-In 4 (ACLU 
of N. Cal., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732269. 
 58. Ionescu, supra note 56. 
 59. See Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing on ECPA, Part 2 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Assoc. Prof. of Computer and Info. Sci., 
Univ. of Pa.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/04252013/Blaze%2004252013.pdf (last visited June 
22, 2012) (noting that “assumptions that might have been true several years ago, such as that 
GPS satellites always provide higher precision location information than the cellular network 
does, are no longer universally true today”). 
 60. Ionescu, supra note 56; The Collection and Use of Location Information for 
Commercial Purposes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, the Subcomm. 
on Communications, Technology and the Internet, and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection, 112th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Lorrie Faith Cranor, Assoc. Prof. of 
Computer Sci. & Eng’g & Pub. Policy, Carnegie Mellon Univ.), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100224/Cranor.Testimony.2010.02.2
4.pdf. 
 61. Ionescu, supra note 56.  See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER 
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 33 (2012) [hereinafter FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY 
REPORT], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 62. Ozer et al., supra note 57, at 4; see also Janne Lindqvist et al., I’m the Mayor of My 
House: Examining Why People Use foursquare - a Social-Driven Location Sharing Application, 
29 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING 1 (2011),  
available at http://www.winlab.rutgers.edu/~janne/chi2011web.pdf. 
 63. Lindqvist et al., supra note 62. 
 64. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33. 
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a laptop, a mobile phone follows its user, tucked into a back pocket or 
a purse.
65
  The mobile phone is powered at most times, collecting vast 
amounts of data about its user everywhere.
66
  In 2011, two security 
researchers reported that iPhones store an unencrypted file of location 
data history and automatically send it to Apple—though without 
identifying each particular user.
67
  Apple acknowledged that the 
magnitude of the location history was a bug, but continued to 
maintain seven days worth of data.
68
  Upon closer inspection, it turned 
out that Android phones similarly collect and store data.
69
  
Unbeknownst to users, location data can also be collected by the 
numerous apps that can be downloaded to a smartphone.  Certain apps 
automatically transmit the phone’s location data to external sites with 
regular intervals.
70
  Apps can also share the information with 
advertising networks with data flows so complicated that users would 
be perplexed even if they were put on notice.
71
  And even users who 
knowingly self-disclose their location online can sometimes 
unintentionally tip-off a burglar or a stalker.
72
  Users may simply not 
anticipate how pieces of their data can be compiled and analyzed 
further to provide very detailed predictions of their future locations 
and actions.
73
  This “dataveillance” is merely a side effect of the many 
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FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/best-practices-respect-mobile-
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WIRED (Apr. 20, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/iphone-tracks/; 
Brian X. Chen, Why and How Apple Is Collecting Your iPhone Location Data, WIRED (Apr. 21, 
2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/apple-iphone-tracking/. 
 68. Apple Q&A on Location Data, APPLE (Apr.  27, 2011), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html. 
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Too, THE NEXT WEB (Apr. 21, 2011, 9:31 PM), http://thenextweb.com/google/2011/04/21/its-
not-just-the-iphone-android-stores-your-location-data-too/. 
 70. See Blaze, supra note 59. 
 71. FTC MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 54, at 8 (discussing a “survey [that] 
showed that many apps . . . shared information with third parties, including advertising 
networks, without disclosing this fact”). 
 72. See, e.g., PLEASE ROB ME, http://pleaserobme.com/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); The 
Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223), AL FRANKEN 1, 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/121011_LocationPrivacyProtection.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013) (reporting that in 2006 “approximately 26,000 persons are victims of GPS 
stalking”). 
 73. Robert Lee Hotz, The Real Smart Phone, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011, 7 :34 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547604576263261679848814.html; FTC 
CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33 (citing Comment of Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, cmt. #00400, at 3); ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE 
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useful functions that mobile apps serve.
74
  It potentially enables both 
greater surveillance by the government and monitoring by our peers.
75
 
As the various risks posed by geolocation data are being 
unveiled to smartphone users, they become increasingly worried 
about services that rely on such data.
76
  Empirical studies suggest that 
the concern for privacy prevents some users from taking advantage of 
location sharing apps.
77
  Those users that do use them, try to avoid 
disclosing their home and work locations, as well as the locations of 
their friends’ homes.78  The cautious use of technology observed from 
studies could be explained by a desire for basic liberties.  As Jeffrey 
Reiman observed almost a decade ago, when technology enables 
perfect surveillance, individuals stand to lose their freedom, their 
sense of individuality, and the desire to be different and 
experimental.
79
  They lose their freedom to engage in private 
activities for fear of embarrassment or potential damage to their 
careers.
80
  And if individuals constantly think about how their actions 
may be perceived by others, they stop acting spontaneously and 
restrain themselves to a few well-rehearsed moves.
81
  With this, they 
also lose their symbolic notion of “self-ownership.”82  But most 
importantly, they lose their “inner personal core that is the source of 
 
AGE OF BIG DATA 4 (2012), available at 
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf. 
 74. See NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 55, at 23-24 (citing Roger 
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 75. Id. at 24. 
 76. Jennifer Urban et al., Mobile Phones & Privacy (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Res., Paper 
No. 2103405, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405; 
Privacy Please! U.S. Smartphone App Users Concerned with Privacy When It Comes to 
Location, NIELSEN (Apr. 21, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/privacy-
please-u-s-smartphone-app-users-concerned-with-privacy-when-it-comes-to-location/. 
 77. See JAN LAUREN BOYLES ET AL., PRIVACY AND DATA MANAGEMENT ON MOBILE 
DEVICES (2012), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf 
(finding that “57% of all app users have either uninstalled an app over concerns about having to 
share their personal information, or declined to install an app in the first place for similar 
reasons”); see also Lindqvist et al., supra note 62 (noting that research “has found that privacy 
is a barrier to adoption of location sharing services”). 
 78. See Lindqvist et al., supra note 62. 
 79. Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks 
to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 11, 27 (1995). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 38. 
 82. Id. 
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criticism of convention, of creativity, rebellion and renewal.”83  This 
is not only a loss for individuals, but affects innovation and societal 
progress more generally.
84
  Mobile users may not be thinking about 
the big picture.  But the short-term fear of losing freedom to make 
individual choices may explain why users are anxious that the 
increased use of location data in mobile apps could lead to greater 
monitoring of their movements. 
Real-time identification apps raise similar concerns.  By 
identifying a face with a mobile phone camera, the app generates a 
record of that individual’s location.85  The record can be stored in the 
phone or be uploaded to a social network, where it may be connected 
to the photographed individual’s profile.86  The uploaded photo can 
contain embedded metadata such as when and where the photo was 
taken.
87
  This means that real-time identification apps can generate 
location data for a particular individual, which may be far more 
precise than the geolocation data based on GPS or distance to cell 
towers.  It may also be more sensitive because the photo shows what 
the person is doing and whom she is with, while her facial expression 
may reveal her mood.
88
  The decision of how that location data is 
shared is ultimately with the app user rather than the photographed 
individual.  It could therefore result in unwanted collection and 
sharing of location data. 
Both location data and real-time identification are difficult to 
protect because they often involve the contradictory notion of 
“privacy in public.”89  The black and white polarity between private 
 
 83. Id. at 42. 
 84. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 213, 225 (1995). 
 85. See Soltani, supra note 27; Steven Musil, Facebook Shuts Down Face.com APIs, Klik 
App, CNET NEWS (July 8, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57468247-
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 86. See id. 
 87. See e.g., Hanni Fakhoury, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words, Including Your 
Location, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/picture-worth-thousand-words-including-your-location 
(location data embedded in photos). 
 88. Bianca Bosker, Affectiva’s Emotion Recognition Tech: When Machines Know What 
You’re Feeling, The HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 24, 2012, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/24/affectiva-emotion-recognition-
technology_n_2360136.html. 
 89. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/privacy.pdf (last visited June 23, 2013).  Both 
location data and real-time recognition can of course also be used to track individuals when they 
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and public spheres has largely been rejected as scholars have 
developed more elaborate conceptualizations of privacy.  Yet current 
privacy law and theory still recognize that privacy interests are not 
absolute and must be balanced against competing interests.
90
  
Asserting a privacy interest in public space is often seen to have 
implications for other interests—such as a photographer’s desire to 
capture her surroundings or a government’s interest in conducting 
surveillance to ensure public safety.
91
  It is easy to dismiss a privacy 
interest in public with an understanding that a person has voluntarily 
chosen to give up her privacy by appearing in public.
92
  The lack of 
privacy is seen as the price people pay to avoid a life in isolation.  
They are rewarded with social interaction, financial opportunities, 
cultured life, and other benefits.  But until now, this transaction has 
not in practice led to complete loss of privacy.  People have been free 
to move about in public and rely on their anonymity as against 
strangers.  The ability to track their movements with location data and 
real-time identification changes the terms of the social contract. 
B. No Notice or Consent 
While real-time identification and geolocation apps are both 
capable of collecting sensitive location data, they have one stark 
difference: the real-time identification app can collect, use, and share 
location data pertaining to a passer-by, who has neither brought the 
phone to the location in question, nor downloaded the relevant app.  
And while commentators question the effectiveness of notice in 
geolocation apps,
93
 it is clear that there is no such notice at all in real-
time identification apps. 
Not all apps that collect or use geolocation data provide a 
privacy notice to the users.
94
  Some of these apps have recently come 
under scrutiny for failing to provide a notice before collecting private 
 
are in private places. 
 90. Id. at 571. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE 70 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
 94. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at 33.  See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE 
& PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, & TECHNOLOGY (2012) (noting that in 2011 
“22 out of 30 [mobile apps] did not have a privacy policy”); Janice Y. Tsai et al., Location-
Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and Controls, CYLAB USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
LAB. 8 (February 2010), 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/LBSprivacy/files/TsaiKelleyCranorSadeh_2009.pdf (finding that only 
66% of location based apps provided a privacy policy). 
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information about children and Californians—two groups that have 
been afforded greater legal protection than the average person in the 
U.S.
95
  Pending legislation would further require all companies that 
collect location data to get users’ permission before collecting or 
sharing it.
96
  But even when apps do ask users to agree to privacy 
notices on a phone, the value of that exercise is questionable.  Long 
privacy policies in small print, split up over multiple pages on a small 
mobile screen are not likely to put consumers on notice.
97
  For that 
reason, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recommended that 
app developers work out alternatives to privacy policies, such as data 
use icons, privacy dashboards, and just-in-time privacy disclosures.
98
  
These tools are meant to communicate data practices in a streamlined 
manner that take up less physical space on a mobile screen and 
provides better overview.
99
 
Effective privacy disclosures and meaningful consent primarily 
protect a notion of privacy known as “control over information.”100  
This is the idea that when individuals try to protect the privacy of 
their information, they are not seeking to prevent everyone from 
knowing it.
101
  Rather they want to control what particular individuals 
know about them.
102
  They disclose more details about their personal 
lives to their inner circle of friends, family, or others whom they 
trust.
103
  Indeed, limited disclosure of information is considered 
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dispatches/2012/12/franken-pushes-last-minute-action-location-privacy-bill. 
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necessary to foster those types of relationships.
104
  But at the same 
time, people do not want their personal information to become public 
or shared with individuals who have no business knowing it.
105
  At a 
more functional level, control over information guards people against 
prejudice.  Unlike computers that make predictable determinations 
based on specified parameters, humans are prone to making 
subjective decisions based on gut feeling and without filtering out 
certain irrelevant factors.  It is therefore helpful to be able to shield 
personal information like political affiliation or sexual orientation 
from everyday decision makers, such as prospective employers or 
teachers.  In the digital age, privacy notices are meant to help mobile 
users to manage the flow of their information by specifying what 
particular information they reveal while using an app and how that 
information will be used.  The users may then select to share their 
location data with friends over an online social network to provide 
recommendations, or to meet up with friends that happen to be 
around, or simply to let their friends know what they are up to.  
Sometimes, they can control the information flow by restricting their 
privacy settings such that their information is not publicly available to 
others. 
While notice and consent is currently the cornerstone of 
American privacy law, it is notably absent from the process of 
recognizing individuals with real-time identification apps.  The 
person whose face is automatically recognized may never even know 
that she is being photographed or that the picture is used to identify 
her in real-time.  If the real-time identification app provides a privacy 
notice upon installation, the notice is shown only to the user and does 
not reach other people whose data is collected and used.  Some apps 
appear to rely on the notice that Facebook provides to its users when 
they upload photos to the social network.
106
  But that notice cannot 
reasonably warn a Facebook user that a particular real-time 
identification app could use the photos years later to automatically 
recognize the users’ face in public.  It also cannot effectively inform 
users that this information can be used to determine their location at 
any point in time—even if they purposefully do not use geolocation 
data on their own phones.  In short, when a real-time identification 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See FaceLook Face Recognition Lite, ITUNES, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/facelook-face-recognition/id512967999?mt=8 (“FaceLook 
doesn’t recognize friends who blocked 3rd party apps from accessing their [Facebook] photo”). 
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app identifies an individual in public, the app fails to provide the 
person with an opportunity to control her information because the app 
simply has no interaction with her. 
C. The Ability to De-Anonymize a Face 
Perhaps the most vocal concern with respect to real-time 
identification apps is that they could be used to recognize anonymous 
faces in the street.
107
  Face biometrics is particularly sensitive because 
people expose their faces publicly at most times and the appearance 
of a face cannot easily be altered.
108
  Today, people rely on the fact 
that there are only a limited number of individuals that can recognize 
them.  They can seek to avoid those people when they do not wish to 
be noted.  As Alan Westin eloquently articulated: 
[One] state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when the individual is in 
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, 
freedom from identification and surveillance.  He may be riding a 
subway, attending a ball game, or walking the streets; he is among 
people and knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a 
well-known celebrity, he does not expect to be personally 
identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would 
operate if he were known to those observing him.  In this state the 
individual is able to merge into the “situational landscape.”  
Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in 
public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that 
men [and women] seek in open spaces and public arenas . . . . 
109
 
The ability to remain anonymous in public allows individuals to 
expose their unique faces while doing things they would not want 
others to know about.  This could be a “minor non-compliance” with 
rules that we do not anticipate will be upheld at all times.
110
  As 
Westin pointed out, society will sometimes let people off the hook for 
minor traffic violations or for “smoking in the restrooms” to allow 
them to release some of the pressure that society imposes upon them 
 
 107. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF 
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES i-ii (2012) [hereinafter FACING FACTS], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facialrecognition/p115406commissionfacialrecognitiontechnologiesr
pt.pdf. 
 108. Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More Than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face 
Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165 (2012); see also FACING 
FACTS, supra note 107, at 19 (discussing that “[a] consumer’s face is a persistent identifier that 
cannot be changed in the way that a consumer could get a new credit card number or delete a 
tracking cookie”). 
 109. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967). 
 110. Id. 
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at other times.
111
  But sometimes the secret act is not going to be a 
violation at all.
112
  Culturally, most people would not want to be seen 
purchasing contraceptives by their parents, children, or even siblings.  
They may not want their employer to see them going to a therapist or 
an AA meeting.  They may not want to have all their friends 
witnessing how they desperately try to charm someone on a first date.  
Real-time identification apps could be used to recognize individuals 
in these potentially embarrassing moments.  And they can be used to 
spread information about what they were doing beyond the few 
strangers that actually witnessed the situation in real-time. 
D. Government Access to Data 
While the discussion in this article focuses primarily on 
companies’ collection and use of biometric data, it is entirely possible 
for privately collected data to end up in the hands of government 
agencies.
113
  Currently, an agency only needs a subpoena or a court 
order issued pursuant to a lower standard than a warrant to obtain 
biometric data or photos of identified individuals with time and 
location meta data from a provider that stores the information 
remotely (as opposed to on the users’ home computer).114  The agency 
must first notify the user, but can postpone the notice if it believes 
that the user will delete the information or there is another special 
reason for not notifying the user in advance.
115
  There is now some 
movement to introduce a warrant requirement when agencies try to 
obtain location data.
116
  A pending bill would likely also apply to 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, NSA Surveillance May Be Legal — But It’s 
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsa-
surveillance-may-be-legal--but-its-unconstitutional/2013/06/21/b9ddec20-d44d-11e2-a73e-
826d299ff459_story.html (last visited June 22, 2013). 
 114. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (West 2013).  Unlike the probable 
cause showing that is normally required for a search warrant, a court order can be issued under 
this provision “if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”  Id. § 2703(d).  It should be noted that this provision only regulates data held by 
providers of electronic communication and remote computing services.  As such, an agency 
seeking this type of data from another source, such as a shopping mall security camera, may not 
even need to satisfy this lower standard. 
 115. Id. § 2705.  If there is no special reason for postponing notice and the agency does not 
wish to provide prior notice, it needs to get a warrant to obtain the information.  Id. § 2703(a). 
 116. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 639, 113th Congress (2013), available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s639. 
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photo metadata because it is “derived from the operation of [a phone 
and can] be used to determine or infer information regarding [a 
person’s] location.”117  But the biometric data itself would still be 
obtainable pursuant to a lower standard court order or a subpoena.  
Moreover, there is even less data protection when an agency is 
investigating something related to foreign intelligence.
118
  As a result 
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the foreign intelligence issue does not 
have to be the primary purpose of an investigation to suspend the 
ordinary electronic surveillance protections; it need only be a 
“significant purpose.”119  Privacy issues surrounding privately 
collected biometric data are inextricable from issues of government 
surveillance.  If companies do not want to become conduits for 
surveillance of their users,
120
 they also need to design their services to 
avoid collecting or retaining unnecessary data.
121
 
While it may be practical for government agencies to tap into 
readily developed private databases with information, it is not the 
only way that government agencies can get hold of biometric data.  
The FBI is developing its own face recognition system, which is to 
use a mug shot database of 12 million arrested individuals.
122
  It has 
also partnered with state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) to 
get access to databases of driver’s license photos.123  Coupled with 
extensive anti-masking laws, expanding networks of closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras, and video surveillance by drones, it 
could put an end to anonymity in public as we know it today.
124
  For 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823 
(a)(7)(B), and 1881(a). 
 119. Id.;  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (“FISA, as amended, does 
not oblige the government to demonstrate to the FISA court that its primary purpose in 
conducting electronic surveillance is not criminal prosecution.”). 
 120. See ECPA Reform: Why Now? DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, 
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 121. See infra Part IV.D. 
 122. Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); FBI 
Criminal Justice Information Services Division Staff Paper – Update on Next Generation 
Identification, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2012), https://www.eff.org/document/fbi-
cjis-staff-paper-next-generation-identification. 
 123. FBI Performs Massive Virtual Line-up by Searching DMV Photos, ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (June 17, 2013), http://epic.org/2013/06/fbi-performs-massive-virtual-
l.html (last visited June 23, 2013). 
 124. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 2012) (“A person whose identity is 
concealed by the person in a public place by means of a robe, mask, or other disguise, unless 
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now, this system may not be very effective because photos of criminal 
suspects, particularly images from security cameras, are not likely to 
be the high quality frontal images that can easily be matched to mug 
shots and driver’s license photos.125  This system will further not have 
the benefit of contextual information that allows consumer apps to 
make better guesses based on that users are more likely to appear in 
photos with particular friends.  That is unless the program mines 
social network data, which it possibly does.
126
  Consumer apps also 
rely on their users to confirm or deny automatic identification of their 
friends, training the identification algorithm every time.  Conversely, 
it would be very difficult to continuously train a government 
identification system as to all the individuals in its database, which 
could include everyone with a drivers’ license.127  Given the likely 
limited effectiveness of a government identification system, there is 
also a potential for misidentification with severe civil liberties 
implications for those who are unjustly accused.  Although beyond 
the scope of this article, we also need to think about appropriate 
accountability for using face recognition in law enforcement.
128
  And 
 
based on religious beliefs, or incidental to amusement, entertainment, protection from weather, 
or medical treatment, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: 
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277 
(2002); Webcast: Hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=36ffa9c8160f81a25730563dc7e8c551  
(last visited June 23, 2013) (responding that the FBI currently uses “drones for surveillance on 
U.S. soil”); FAA List of Certificates of Authorizations (COAs), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/document/faa-list-certificates-authorizations-coas/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2013) (listing FBI as one of the agencies with drones certified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration); see also Tim Maly, Anti-Drone Camouflage: What to Wear in Total 
Surveillance, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/01/anti-
drone-camouflage-apparel/. 
 125. Sara Reardon, FBI Launches $1 Billion Face Recognition Project, NEWSCIENTIST 
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528804.200-fbi-launches-1-billion-
face-recognition-project.html; Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition Technology Didn’t 
Help ID the Tsarnaevs, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing. 
 126. See Richard Lardner, Your New Facebook ‘Friend’ May be the FBI, MBC NEWS 
(Mar. 16, 2010, 10:54:25 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35890739/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/your-new-
facebook-friend-may-be-fbi/. 
 127. See Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition Technology Didn’t Help ID the 
Tsarnaevs, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing. 
 128. See Christopher Rutledge Jones, 'EyePhones': A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into 
Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 946 (2012); see also Francesca Bignami, European 
Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Data-Mining, 48 
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until government agencies develop their own effective identification 
techniques, there will be a lot of temptation to use private sector 
databases and identification methods, which are not adequately 
protected by our outdated electronic surveillance laws. 
III. EMERGING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO FACE RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY 
As the discussion above suggests, real-time identification is in its 
infancy.  Even though implementations are relatively few, regulators 
have yet to catch up to its development.  A couple of states have 
specific statutes regulating the collection and use of biometric data.
129
  
In the rest of the U.S., the best hope of redress is the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion, which is problematic because a person’s facial 
features will mostly not be secluded from the public and courts 
generally do not consider data collection to be sufficiently offensive 
for the tort.
130
  Over the past couple of years, however, a few general 
regulatory responses to face recognition technology have provided 
some initial guidance in this new field. 
The debate over the privacy of face recognition technology 
heated up in 2011 as Facebook introduced the “Photo Tag Suggest” 
feature in Europe.
131
  Its earlier introduction in the U.S. was rather 
uneventful.
132
  But the European launch triggered almost immediate 
investigation by several European data protection agencies.
133
  After 
 
B.C. L. REV. 609 (2007) (discussing the various procedural and substantive protections of law 
enforcement use of data mining that have developed in Europe). 
 129. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5 (West 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 503.001 (West 2012). 
 130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (providing that “[o]ne who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or other-wise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE 
DIGITAL PERSON 59 (2004) (noting that courts have dismissed “actions based on obtaining a 
person’s unlisted phone number, selling the names of magazine subscribers to direct mail 
companies, and collecting and disclosing an individual’s past insurance history”). 
 131. See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 15, 
2010), https://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=467145887130 (last updated June 30, 2011). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Gesichtserkennungsfunktion von Facebook Verstößt Gegen Europäisches und 
Deutsches Datenschutzrecht [Facebook’s facial recognition feature violates European and 
German data protection law], HMBBFDI (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.datenschutz-
hamburg.de/news/detail/article/gesichtserkennungsfunktion-von-facebook-verstoesst-gegen-
europaeisches-und-deutsches-
datenschutzrech.html?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=170&cHash=b9607e92ef91d779f308acd01b
7dd639 (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); see also BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [BDSG] [FEDERAL 
DATA PROTECTION ACT], Dec. 20, 1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. I] at 2954, §§ 38(3)-
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the Hamburg Data Protection Agency concluded that the feature 
violated European law, Facebook voluntarily discontinued its use in 
Europe, apparently going beyond recommendations of the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner.
134
  But in the meantime, the European 
Article 29 Working Party (WP29) issued an advisory opinion about 
how face recognition technology can be implemented in online and 
mobile technologies in compliance with European law.
135
  In the U.S., 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center asked the FTC to also 
investigate Facebook’s Photo Tag Suggest, alleging that the feature 
amounted to an unfair and deceptive trade practice under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act.
136
  The FTC responded with a workshop in December 
2011 to solicit comprehensive information about different uses of face 
recognition technology.
137
  Based on that workshop, it recommended 
best practices for the industry in October 2012.  Ironically, in 
Facebook’s spirit of “mov[ing] fast and break[ing] things,” Photo Tag 
Suggest triggered rapid regulatory responses to many different 
implementations of face recognition technology, which had 
previously been developing in a near regulatory vacuum since the 
1960s.
138
  While these responses are not primarily focused on real-
time identification, they offer some insight into how the law will 
address this technology. 
A. Federal Trade Commission Guidelines on Face Recognition 
 
38(4), as amended Sept. 14, 1994, available at 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/BDSG_ 
idFv01092009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-
europe.html; Report of Review of Facebook Ireland’s Implementation of Audit 
Recommendations Published – Facebook Turns off Tag Suggest in the EU, IRELAND OFF. OF 
THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/21-
09-12-Press-Release--Facebook-Ireland-Audit-Review-Report/1233.htm. 
 135. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16. 
 136. See Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc. and the Facial Identification of Users, No. C-
4365 (F.T.C. 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Facebook], available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPIC_FB_FR_FTC_Complaint_06_10_11.pdf; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 137. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii. 
 138. See Registration Statement (Form S-1), Facebook, 69 (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://battellemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Facebook-S-1.pdf. I have previously 
surveyed different laws that potentially apply to face recognition technology. Welinder, supra 
note 107. 
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Technology 
The FTC’s recommended best practices for the use of face 
recognition technology were based on its revised framework for 
consumer privacy issued earlier in 2012.
139
  The framework would 
require companies that collect significant amount of data to 
implement three baseline principles into its use of consumer data: “[1] 
privacy by design, [2] simplified choice, and [3] greater 
transparency.”140  The best practices primarily apply these principles 
to three case studies: the established fields of face detection in photos 
and classification of faces by demographics in digital signs,
141
 and the 
more groundbreaking use of the technology in social networks.
142
  
The FTC did not discuss mobile technologies and real-time 
identification in any greater detail.  It mentioned them as “possible 
future uses of facial recognition technologies.”143  Significantly, the 
FTC noted that a real-time identification app capable of “identify[ing] 
anonymous individuals on the street or in a bar could cause serious 
privacy and physical safety concerns, although such an app might 
have benefits for some consumers.”144  The FTC therefore suggested 
that “affirmative express consent” may be necessary before a stranger 
may recognize a previously unknown individual.
145
  “Opt-out 
consent” would not be sufficient in that situation because there is no 
going back once a stranger discovers a person’s identify.146  To 
explain this concept, the FTC provided the following example: 
Consider the example of a mobile app that allows users to identify 
strangers in public places, such as on the street or in a bar.  If such 
an app were to exist, a stranger could surreptitiously use the 
camera on his mobile phone to take a photo of an individual who is 
walking to work or meeting a friend for a drink and learn that 
individual’s identity—and possibly more information, such as her 
address—without the individual even being aware that her photo 
 
 139. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 1. 
 140. FTC CONSUMER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 61, at iii. 
 141. A digital sign is an advertising board with a built-in camera and software that can 
determine the demographics of individuals that are looking at it.  FACING FACTS, supra note 
107, at i. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 8. 
 145. Id. at iii. 
 146. Id. at 19; see also DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, & 
LAW 433 (2012) (describing “opt-out” consent as providing “a default rule that the company can 
use or disclose personal information in the ways it desires so long as the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise”). 
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was taken.  Given the significant privacy and safety risks that such 
an app would raise, only consumers who have affirmatively chosen 
to participate in such a system should be identified.
147
 
The question remains how an individual can affirmatively submit 
to such an identification system in practice.  Is it sufficient for an 
individual to provide consent to extraction of biometric data when 
submitting a photo?  Or does the individual need to allow each 
particular app to use the photo?  As this excerpt suggests, the FTC 
does not believe this scenario to be an issue yet; the commissioners 
were merely hypothesizing about possible requirements “[i]f such an 
app were to exist.”148  This explains the lack of specificity in its 
recommendation with respect to mobile apps.  Indeed, the apps that I 
have described above do not currently appear to be designed to allow 
identification by strangers because they are limited to recognizing its 
users’ Facebook friends.149  It is, however, entirely possible that such 
an app may develop in the near future, leveraging Facebook’s vast 
image database or other online photos that are even more easily 
available.
150
  Therefore, the FTC has recommended that social 
networks and other similar online services protect their photos against 
scraping by third parties.
151
 
Even when strangers do not perform the identification, users 
may still need to “affirmative[ly and] express[ly] consent” to the use 
of their biometric data if it “materially differ[s]” from the 
representations pursuant to which they originally submitted their 
photos.
152
  How would this recommendation apply to apps like KLIK, 
FaceLook, and SocialCamera that use photos collected by Facebook?  
It seems that if Facebook’s privacy policy does not specify that real-
time identification apps can use Facebook photos to identify users 
offline, the apps need to enter into separate clickwrap agreements 
with Facebook users.
153
  And regardless of what the original privacy 
 
 147. Id. at iii. 
 148. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 6-7. 
 149. Limiting the identification to a user’s social network friends allows the current 
applications to do more accurate recognition because one person’s social circle is less likely to 
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unless you have very high quality data.  See Erika Eichelberger, Why Facial Recognition 
Technology Didn’t Help ID the Tsarnaevs, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/04/facial-recognition-technology-boston-bombing. 
 150. Id. 
 151. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at ii. 
 152. Id. at iii. 
 153. Clickwraps are terms that are agreed to by clicking “I agree terms and conditions.”  
Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 810 (2007). 
WELINDER 2/3/2014  12:33 PM 
2013] FACING REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION 117 
policy provides, the apps would need to enter into new clickwraps 
with any other individuals in photos—i.e. those who did not submit 
the photo to Facebook in the first place.  As of December 2012, 
Facebook’s privacy policy does not specifically inform users that 
their photos can be used by real-time identification apps.
154
  It does 
provide that “[o]nce you share information with your friends and 
others, they may be able to sync it with or access it via their mobile 
phones and other devices.”  It further provides that “[i]f you want to 
completely block applications from getting your information when 
your friends and others use them, you will need to turn off all 
Platform applications.”  However, extraction of biometric data and 
real-time identification are uses that arguably are materially different 
from Facebook’s broad representations that photos will be shared 
with apps or synced to friends’ mobile phones.  If so, the real-time 
identification apps that tap into Facebook’s photo album also need to 
get an “affirmative express consent” from the individuals they 
identify.  This is particularly important because Facebook’s privacy 
policy notifies users that they are able to opt out of Facebook’s face 
recognition feature when uploading photos.  Given this more specific 
provision suggesting control with respect to automatic face 
recognition, users may reasonably conclude that the broader provision 
regarding mobile apps does not pertain to face recognition 
technology:
155
 
We are able to suggest that your friend tag you in a picture by 
scanning and comparing your friend’s pictures to information 
we’ve put together from the other photos you’ve been tagged in.  
This allows us to make these suggestions.  You can control 
whether we suggest that another user tag you in a photo using the 
“How Tags work” settings.
156
 
The broader problem with online consent is that users seldom 
know what they consent to even if they are prompted to agree to a 
 
 154. See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM (Dec. 11, 2012), 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#infoaboutyou (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 155. Provided that Facebook’s privacy policy is to be interpreted as a contract, a provision 
that more directly applies to the matter at issue prevails over a more general provision when the 
two are in conflict.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) (1981) (“specific terms 
and exact terms are given greater weight than general language”).  However, sometimes privacy 
policies are considered to be “general statements of policy” and not enforceable under contact 
law.  In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation, No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D. 
Minn. June 4, 2004); see also Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 
2004). 
 156. See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM (Dec. 11, 2012), 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#infoaboutyou (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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clickwrap.
157
 
It also appears that the FTC generally approves of opt-out choice 
when the face recognition technology is part of the social network, 
provided it is “easy to find” and “meaningful.”158  In that case, users 
should get a conspicuous notice (not within the site’s privacy policy) 
describing the new data collection and use.
159
  So if Facebook were to 
reinstate its newly acquired app KLIK, it may not need to obtain 
users’ affirmative consent to use their photos in this manner, provided 
users get a separate notice on Facebook and are able to easily opt out. 
The FTC also noted that particular applications of face 
recognition technology can provide certain privacy or security 
functions.
160
  This is the case with apps that look for a phone owner’s 
facial features to unlock the phone.
161
  While these apps are not 
intended to share biometric data, they still need to implement some 
privacy measures, like storing the data securely.
162
 
Other apps may not be privacy or security protective and yet 
may raise less of a privacy concern because they do not “identify” an 
individual.  The FTC indicated that even apps that do not process 
biometric data to determine the identity of individuals will have to 
implement privacy protections that are appropriate for that particular 
situation.
163
  It gave the example of SceneTap, which analyzes photos 
from bars and informs consumers about the resulting demographics to 
consumers through a mobile app.
164
  When an app does not link 
biometric data to individual, it still needs to protect its photo database 
from misuse and delete photos after a reasonable time.
165
 
The few guiding principles in the FTC’s report with respect to 
real-time identification do not create any hard legal obligations.  They 
are only intended as recommendations and the FTC expressly stated 
that it will not base its enforcement actions on anything in the report 
 
 157. See Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (noting that 
“Clickwraps put some pressure on the classical notion of assent derived from bargained 
agreements, because they substitute a blanket, take-it-or-leave-it assent for the classical notion 
that the parties actually thought about and agreed to the terms of the deal.”). 
 158. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 19. 
 159. Id. at 18-19. 
 160. Id. at 7. 
 161. Id. at 6. 
 162. Id. at 5-6. 
 163. Id. at 11-12. 
 164. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 5-6. 
 165. Id. 
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that exceeds already established legal requirements.
166
  The report is 
nevertheless helpful because it gives companies an initial idea as to 
how future laws in this field could develop, and allow them to design 
their services accordingly. 
B. European Union Article 29 Working Party Opinion on 
Facial Recognition in Online and Mobile Services 
By the time the FTC issued its recommendations on the use of 
face recognition technology in late 2012, some of its European 
counterparts had already opined on the issue.  First, the Hamburg data 
protection agency deemed Facebook’s use of the technology to 
violate European laws.
167
  Facebook tacitly agreed by disabling its 
face recognition feature in Europe.
168
  Second, the WP29, charged 
with providing independent advice on the implementation of national 
laws adopted pursuant to the European Data Protection Directive,
169
 
issued an opinion regarding the uses of face recognition technology in 
online and mobile services.
170
  Given that the WP29 opinion 
specifically focuses on mobile services, unlike the FTC, it provides 
somewhat more concrete guidance with respect to real-time 
identification apps.
171
  It should be noted that the WP29 opinion is of 
limited legal authority because WP29 serves only an advisory role 
with respect to the Directive, whereas the European Court of Justice 
reserves “a monopoly of final interpretation” of EU law.172  But the 
opinion is still a persuasive authority, given that it is the only EU 
opinion on this specific matter. 
 
 166. Id. at iii. 
 167. See Facebook’s Biometric Database Continues to Be Unlawful, supra note 134. 
 168. Loek Essers, Facebook Deleted All EU Facial Recognition Data, Regulators 
Confirm, CFO WORLD (Feb. 07, 2013, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.cfoworld.com/technology/57103/facebook-deleted-all-eu-facial-recognition-data-
regulators-confirm. 
 169. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 29-30 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter 
Directive], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2012). 
 170. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16. 
 171. See id. at 3 (stating that the photo in its example of uses of face recognition 
technology “may be captured direct from a smartphone camera.”). 
 172. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 656, 673 (1996), available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1526&context=ilj (last visited Apr. 19, 
2013). 
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The EU Data Protection Directive—first adopted in 1995 and 
now in the process of being updated—requires the EU member states 
to adopt national legislation regulating the automatic processing of 
personal data.
173
  Broadly, those laws are to ensure that a 
“controller”174 of data processing protects the data and informs the 
individuals to whom the data pertains about the controller’s data 
practices.
175
  Subject to a few exceptions, personal data may only be 
processed if the person to whom it pertains has freely consented or 
when the processing is necessary to carry out a contract with that 
person or a legal obligation.
176
 
The WP29 opined that photos and personally identifiable 
biometrics are personal data within the scope of the Directive.
177
  This 
means that a real-time identification app that automatically processes 
photos or personally identifiable biometrics must first get the 
individuals’ informed consent before using their data, unless it has 
some other legal basis for the processing.
178
  The app may not transfer 
extracted biometrics to other systems.
179
  If it uses face recognition 
technology to provide users with sensitive information about the 
individual being identified, such as ethnicity, religious beliefs, or 
health records, the app may further need to obtain special consent that 
refers to that particular information.
180
  In any event, the app 
developer must try to minimize the amount of data that the app 
collects to what is absolutely necessary to deliver the service.
181
  The 
data that is collected must also be carefully protected.  The app 
developer must determine whether the data should be stored on the 
app or in the cloud and encrypted if necessary for its security.
182
  At 
the same time, the individuals in the photos must have some way to 
access the photos and biometric data.
183
  These requirements may not 
apply to apps that only extract enough information to detect or 
categorize a face because they are not processing “personal data.”184 
 
 173. Directive, supra note 169, art. 5. 
 174. Id. art. 2(d). 
 175. See id. arts. 7, 17. 
 176. Id. art. 7. 
 177. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 4. 
 178. Id. at 5; Directive, supra note 169, art. 7. 
 179. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 5. 
 180. Id. at 4. 
 181. Id. at 8. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 9. 
 184. Id. at 4. 
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If the main purpose of an app is automatic face recognition, it 
appears that the app developer can provide sufficient notice by 
describing the face recognition process in its terms of use.
185
  The 
terms would of course need to be read and accepted by the individual 
being identified and not only by the person using the app.
186
  But an 
app developer cannot rely on provisions about face recognition 
technology in the general terms of use of a social network from which 
it takes photos because face recognition is not the main purpose of 
that network.
187
  Opt-out privacy settings in an app or a social 
network will likewise not suffice as informed consent, though they 
are important for allowing users to take back their consent if they 
have second thoughts.
188
  Most importantly, the opinion specified that 
the current practice of opting individuals into a biometric database 
simply because they upload photos to an online app does not comply 
with the EU requirements.
189
  When sharing photos with friends 
online, individuals likely do not anticipate that their photos will be 
used for automatic face recognition and they may not even have the 
authority to consent if there are other people in those photos.
190
 
If an app developer cannot rely on the consent provided by the 
phone user, how can it set up the service to obtain consent from the 
person being identified?  First, it would need to collect opt-in consent 
from individuals when it enrolls them in a biometric database, 
whether it does so through a social network or through the app 
itself.
191
  But the EU requirements seemingly present a Catch-22 for 
real-time identification apps because the app would need to process a 
person’s biometric data to determine her identity, whereupon it can 
determine whether she consented to the processing.
192
  If it turns out 
that the individual is not listed in the app’s biometric database, the 
initial processing of her data to determine her identity would be in 
violation of the EU requirements.
193
  The WP29 opinion resolves this 
issue by stating that apps may process photos or biometric data for the 
limited purpose of determining whether the person in question 
 
 185. See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 7. 
 186. See id. at 6. 
 187. See id. at 7. 
 188. See id. at 6-7. 
 189. See id. at 6. 
 190. See id. at 6-7. 
 191. See WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 6. 
 192. See id. at 5. 
 193. See id. 
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consented to being identified.
194
  But if the match against the app’s 
biometric database shows that the individual is either not listed or did 
not consent, the app would need to delete all data it collected in the 
process.
195
  In a real-time identification app, this would probably 
mean that the app would not even show the individual’s name to the 
person running the app if it turned out that the individual did not 
consent to being identified.  This limited processing, the WP29 
reasoned, is necessary to allow app developers to comply with their 
legal obligation to determine whether individuals in photos have 
consented to their services.
196
 
Beyond that, the opinion suggests that app developers may want 
to allow users to blur out the faces of individuals that do not match 
against their biometric database.
197
  That may help users to avoid 
liability under other European laws that sometimes prohibit 
photographing of faces in public places without first getting a 
person’s consent.198 
IV. INITIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REAL-TIME 
IDENTIFICATION 
If the existing regulatory responses leave something to be 
desired when it comes to real-time identification, how should this 
problem be tackled?  In a seminal 1890s piece articulating the 
foundation of our current privacy law, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis observed: 
[Back when] the state of the photographic art was such that one’s 
picture could seldom be taken without his consciously “sitting” for 
the purpose, the law of contract or of trust might afford the prudent 
man sufficient safeguards against the improper circulation of his 
portrait; but since the latest advances in photographic art have 
rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of 
contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required 
protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to.
199
 
 
 194. Id. at 5. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. WP29 Opinion, supra note 16, at 6. 
 198. See Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, The French Right of Image: An 
Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 511, 526 
(1998) (explaining that consent is required unless the photo does not focus on any particular 
person, and the individuals who happen to be in the photo are performing “public, rather than 
private, activities”). 
 199. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
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As this excerpt suggests, instantaneous photography challenged 
the law some hundred years ago just like instantaneous face 
recognition poses difficult questions today.
200
  In the years that 
followed, it came upon courts, legislators, and the public at large to 
determine the laws and norms regulating photography.  The result 
was not a complete prohibition of portable cameras or their use.  To 
the contrary, we have seen continuous innovation in analog and, 
subsequently, digital cameras.  But we have, for example, come to 
prohibit photographing and videotaping private body parts without a 
person’s consent.201  Thanks to Warren and Brandeis, we have also 
developed torts that articulate specific situations when photographing 
or publishing a photo may invade a person’s privacy.202  Other 
jurisdictions have struck differently the balance between a person’s 
privacy and the photographer’s right to capture images.  For example 
in France, a photo focusing on a particular person requires that 
person’s consent—even if the photo is taken in public.203  Just like 
photographs, face recognition will not go away.  But it will require us 
to figure out how and when it can be used. 
In a recent article, I analyzed the privacy implications of the use 
of face recognition technology in social networks.
204
  I concluded that 
the use of photos submitted to an online application for the purpose of 
socializing cannot be used to automatically identify individuals 
without violating what Helen Nissenbaum calls “contextual integrity” 
and I proposed a multifaceted solution to this problem.
205
  It is much 
too early to provide that level of analysis with respect to real-time 
identification apps.  The handful of existing apps do not adequately 
suggest how different uses of face recognition will develop.  They do, 
however, indicate some of the privacy concerns considered in Part 
II(A) above.  Based on these conceptual observations, and drawing 
upon the existing regulatory responses to face recognition technology, 
this Part provides some early recommendations for how real-time 
identification should be addressed.  This analysis is by no means 
intended as a complete policy response to this application of face 
 
211 (1890). 
 200. See id. 
 201. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004). 
 202. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) (“The intrusion 
itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other use of 
any kind of the photograph or information outlined.”). 
 203. Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 198, at 526. 
 204. Welinder, supra note 108. 
 205. Id. 
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recognition technology.  Rather, it is meant to start the dialogue while 
this application evolves to a point where its impact can better be 
analyzed. 
A. Focus on Use Rather than Technology 
When comparing FTC’s Facing Facts report and the WP29 
opinion broadly, it is clear that the latter offers far more concrete 
guidance with the respect to real-time identification.  There are 
several reasons for this.  First, the FTC did not intend to specifically 
address mobile technologies in its report, as is obvious from the case 
studies that it focused on and its suggestion that real-time 
identification apps may not yet exist.  Second, the WP29 opinion 
applied concrete data protection legislation to this particular use.  
Given that there is no baseline privacy legislation in the U.S., the law 
is far less predictable and it is difficult for the FTC to provide 
concrete guidelines for how companies may use biometric data.  
Finally, and most importantly in my view, the FTC’s focus was too 
broad.  It sought to cover all kinds of face recognition technologies 
from software “ensuring that the frame for a video chat feed actually 
includes a face,” to “virtual makeover tools that allow consumers to 
“try on” a pair of glasses or a new hairstyle online,” and to 
“technologies that identify moods or emotions from facial 
expressions,” just to name a few.206  The WP29 opinion, on the other 
hand, focused only on a handful of online and mobile applications of 
the technology and provided a number of specific recommendations 
with respect to those applications.  The specificity of its 
recommendations not only better protects consumers, but also makes 
it easier for app developers to determine the bounds of the law when 
they work on new services. 
In my earlier recommendations on face recognition technology 
in social networks, I argued against a blanket prohibition on face 
recognition technology because the technology also presents useful 
applications, many of which we are still to discover.
207
  Digital 
cameras, for example, use face detection to focus the lens on a face.
208
  
Face recognition technology built into photo management apps like 
Picasa can help users who exhaust the seemingly limitless flash cards 
in their digital cameras to automatically categorize all the photos on 
 
 206. FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at i, 5. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Face Detection, SONY, http://www.sony.co.uk/hub/learnandenjoy/2/1 (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2012). 
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their computers.
209
  The gaming device Kinect uses face recognition 
to keep track of different players so that friends can challenge each 
other in dance or sports in their living rooms rather than just 
exercising their thumbs with the more traditional forms of video 
games.
210
 
Particular uses of the technology, however, may be more 
harmful.  Though it is too early to tell, real-time identification apps 
may arguably fall in the more harmful category, at least when used by 
strangers.  As such, they could invite more stringent regulation, 
making their implementation very difficult, if not impossible.  Any 
regulation that could overly burden or eliminate uses of technology 
needs to be preceded by very careful analysis.  But more importantly, 
any such regulation should narrowly target a use, rather than the 
technology.  With respect to real-time identification, this means 
regulation should focus on real-time identification apps rather than 
regulation covering all uses of face recognition technology.  
Technology neutrality is a well-established regulatory principle that is 
particularly beneficial for rapidly developing technologies.
211
  I would 
argue that tech-neutrality is incorporated into the EU Data Protection 
Directive, which regulates automatic processing of data—a use.  
Though the WP29 opinion appears to focus on a technology, it merely 
applies the tech-neutral Directive to particular uses of face 
recognition. In that sense, the WP29 opinion is fundamentally 
different from the FTC’s Facing Facts report, which seeks to provide 
guidance for developing various applications that use face recognition 
technology.
212
  Going forward, as regulators develop a response to 
real-time identification with more teeth than the Facing Facts report, 
they do well in considering the tech-neutrality principle.  A tech-
neutral solution does not mean that regulation has to be particularly 
broad.  It could, for example, specifically address the instantaneous 
 
 209. See Mitchell, supra note 132. 
 210. Douglas Gantenbein, Helping Kinect Recognize Faces, MICROSOFT RESEARCH (Oct. 
31, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/kinectfacereco-
103111.aspx. 
 211. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in 9 IT & LAW 
SERIES, STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION, DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-
LINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that “[l]egislation should abstract away 
from concrete technologies to the extent that it is sufficiently sustainable and at the same 
provides sufficient legal certainty”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918746. 
 212. Unlike the WP29 Opinion, which specifically applies the tech-neutral Directive, the 
FACING FACTS report only “draw[s] upon the three core [tech-neutral] principles outlined in the 
FTC’s March 2012 report” and is primarily based upon a workshop on face recognition 
technologies.  FACING FACTS, supra note 107, at 1. 
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processing of biometric data, which would apply to real-time 
identification as well as other similar processes. 
It may seem that broad regulation of face recognition technology 
will be more effective because it will cover new face recognition 
technology implementations as they evolve, and does not as easily 
become outdated.  But that reasoning has two major flaws.  First, 
while broad regulation of automatic face recognition could provide 
regulation of new implementations as they crop up, that regulation 
may not be suitable for them because those uses would not have been 
anticipated when the regulation was developed.  The regulation will 
likely unduly burden a new implementation and may not address any 
of its problems (if there are any such problems to be addressed).  
Second, regulation of particular uses may actually outlast seemingly 
broader regulation of a technology.
213
  Consider, for example, a law 
that would regulate collection of data indicating a person’s real-time 
location.  If well-drafted, such a law would apply to sensitive location 
data in geolocation apps and real-time identification apps alike.  And 
it would apply to new technologies that would expose individuals in 
the same manner.
214
  It would be more targeted at the relevant harm 
and address all new technologies that have similar uses.  Using 
Lawrence Lessig’s vocabulary, the law would not need to be 
translated into the language of the future—it will be timeless.215  
Likewise, protection against identification of anonymous individuals 
in public could regulate future technologies that would identify 
individuals from a distance based on their smell or the rhythm of their 
heartbeat.
216
  Conversely, the regulation of face recognition 
 
 213. See Koops, supra note 211; but see Christian Laux, Must RFID-Legislation Be 
Technology Neutral?, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY AT STANFORD LAW SCHOOL 
(Apr. 12, 2007, 1:02 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2007/04/must-rfid-legislation-be-
technology-neutral (arguing that tech-specific regulation may be appropriate for radio frequency 
identification given that it allows the tracking of goods at a time of convergence of the physical 
space and cyberspace through the “Internet of Things”). 
 214. See Koops, supra note 211 (noting that “particular attention must be given to the 
sustainability of laws that target technology, because there is a greater risk than usual that 
changes in the subject matter may soon make the law obsolete”). 
 215. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 157-169 (2d ed. 2006). 
 216. See Jacob Aron, Your Heartbeat Could Keep Your Data Safe, NEWSCIENTIST (Feb. 
11, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21328516.500-your-heartbeat-could-keep-
your-data-safe.html; JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 
215 (2007) (implying that odor recognition technology may one day recognize individuals, 
provided that they have unique bodily odors); see also Paul Marks, Google Glass App Identifies 
You by Your Fashion Sense, NEWSCIENTIST (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729075.600-google-glass-app-identifies-you-by-your-
fashion-sense.html. 
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technology would be useless with respect to these new technologies 
even though they raise very similar concerns.  Indeed, one day, 
regulation of face recognition technology could sound just as outdated 
as the regulation of gramophones or video cassette tapes sounds 
today.
217
 
B. Security by Design 
Security is always important when a company holds personal 
data.  It is particularly important for biometric data given that, unlike 
a compromised password or a stolen credit card, a person’s biometric 
data cannot simply be replaced.
218
  If the photos or biometric data are 
transferred between a mobile app and a website, there are additional 
security risks because the data has to pass through multiple servers, 
each of which could possibly be compromised.  The WP29 therefore 
recommended that apps be designed to locally process and store the 
data.
219
  If that is not possible, the app developer should consider 
using encrypted communication channels or making use of 
cryptographic protocols for processing data.
220
  An individual’s 
biometric data could also be split up over several servers to make 
recognition difficult if one of them is compromised.
221
 
Given that the app will already have a person’s biometric data, it 
may be practical to use biometric encryption when accessing it.
222
  
This would require the app to turn the biometric data into a random 
string that can be used as a key to encrypt and decrypt information.
223
  
 
 217. For example, the regulation of “video cassette tapes” in the Video Privacy Protection 
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Biometric encryption is sometimes considered more secure because it 
uses a person’s face instead of a password that the person can 
remember.
224
  Because the user does not have to memorize the data 
derived from her facial features, biometric identifiers can use longer 
and more complicated numbers that are more difficult to guess or 
steal.
225
  However, it may be less effective when the identity of the 
user is known and the data could be decrypted with a photo of the 
user downloaded from a social network or found in an online image 
search.
226
  For added security, the encryption could be based on 
biometric data combined with a password that is selected by the 
user.
227
 
Some may argue that there is a technical hurdle if someone tries 
to steal biometric data that has been derived using proprietary face 
recognition software.  The argument goes something like this: a 
biometric database compiled with proprietary software can only be 
used to identify the individuals using the same version of that 
particular software.  Consequently, a security breach only as to the 
database may not affect the individuals unless there is also a security 
breach as to the particular proprietary software.  This argument is 
based on “security by obscurity,” which in security research is not 
considered to be a solid security strategy.
228
  In essence, keeping the 
algorithm secret will not help because attackers will eventually find 
vulnerabilities in the system.
229
  Indeed, it may be more effective to 
open source the security development because, “given enough 
eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”230  Some may of course choose to 
keep proprietary software secret for business reasons, but it is 
certainly no substitute for encrypting their data.
231
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Even if biometric databases are kept secure, individuals are still 
not safe from automatic face recognition by strangers.  Around one 
seventh of the earth’s population could have a labeled photo of them 
available on Facebook.
232
  Others provide their headshots online 
through LinkedIn or Google+, or on their company website.  Those 
images are connected to their name and often some other identifying 
information that allows for instant recognition.  And so, it is not 
difficult to compile a biometric database using images available 
online.
233
  The FTC has therefore recommended that companies that 
store labeled photos should maintain their security and protect them 
from being scanned for unauthorized uses.
234
  Even applications that 
only process images without storing them—like digital signs—need 
to consider the security to prevent outsiders from accessing the 
images while they are being processed.
235
  Thus, if a real-time 
identification app only allows users to identify their Facebook friends 
while pointing their camera phone at them without taking or storing 
any photos, it would still need to ensure that third parties cannot 
compromise this process.
236
 
C. Ask (the Right Person) for Permission 
While disagreeing about the type of consent that should be 
required, the FTC report and the WP29 opinion are consistent about 
whom companies should ask for permission: the person to be 
identified.
237
  The FTC report primarily recommends that companies 
seek “affirmative express consent” before either allowing strangers to 
recognize an individual or using the individual’s photo in a materially 
new way.
238
  The WP29 opinion states that consent should be required 
more broadly whenever a company collects photos or personally 
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identifiable biometrics for automatic processing.
239
  Both agencies, 
however, are in agreement that consent must be provided by the 
individual whose face is identified rather than the person that uses the 
face recognition technology or provides the photo.
240
  This will be 
essential for regulation of real-time identification apps because they 
will mostly identify individuals other than the user who downloads 
the app to her phone. 
The regulatory agenda with mobile apps right now is to ensure 
that they provide notice and obtain consent from the phone user 
before using their sensitive data such as geolocation, contacts, or 
surfing habits.
241
  App developers are instructed to develop short and 
sweet privacy notices that users can review when they download the 
app.
242
  They are encouraged to develop privacy icons and 
communicate their data practices to app users via privacy dashboards 
and just-in-time notices.
243
  This approach, however, will not be 
sufficient for real-time identification apps, which use sensitive data 
that pertains to a third party who will not have access to those notices 
on the phone. 
Consent is meaningless unless the person knows to what she is 
consenting.  A clause hidden in a social network’s term of use should 
not be legally sufficient to put an individual on notice that apps can 
tap into that network to gather identifying data.  Given that users 
generally do not read the terms, the WP29’s focus on the main 
purpose of the app is helpful.
244
  If the main purpose of an app is to 
recognize faces, the users who provide their photos will anticipate 
that they will be used in this manner.  If the main purpose is different, 
however, a separate notice and consent is needed to put the users on 
notice.
245
  The FTC has articulated a similar idea in its recent 
consumer privacy guidelines, which provide that separate consent 
may not be required when a data “practice is consistent with the 
context of [a] transaction or the consumer’s existing relationship with 
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the business.”246 
Limited non-consensual collection and processing may be 
acceptable in narrow situations to allow apps to determine whether a 
person has consented.
247
  It may also be necessary to find missing 
persons or to identify an injured individual who is unable to 
consent.
248
  Such exceptions can be complemented by technology that 
allows individuals to object to even this preliminary collection and 
processing—perhaps by registering their general objections 
beforehand.  To avoid generating a database of objecting individuals 
similar to the Do-Not-Call register, there may be ways to 
communicate an objection directly to a real-time identification app.
249
  
Regardless of how it is achieved, an individual should have the ability 
to avoid collection altogether, particularly as apps do have a tendency 
to collect more data than necessary and to not take adequate 
precautions that the information is permanently deleted afterward.  
This brings us to the next recommendation: limited collection and 
regular deletion. 
D. Collect Less; Delete More 
Even when biometric data is collected for a particular purpose 
and pursuant to informed consent, there is the potential for subsequent 
function creep—i.e. that the data could later be misused for a different 
purpose.
250
  When the FTC held a hearing in 2012 to consider how 
companies should protect consumer privacy going forward, several 
groups representing the consumers expressed concern that companies 
are allowed to collect more data than necessary to provide their 
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services.
251
  Companies also often lack clear data retention policies 
that would determine when data should be deleted.  Excessive 
collection of data and its retention for an indefinite time exposes 
consumers to risks that the data can be misused later.  This is 
particularly problematic for companies that use location data, which 
can be used to predict a person’s future movement.  It is likewise a 
problem for biometrics that can be misused to de-anonymize faces in 
the street.  Mobile apps that collect and store this kind of data 
therefore need to limit their collection and regularly delete data that is 
not needed for their services.  Problematically, mobile app developers 
often lack the organizational infrastructure to maintain a good data 
retention policy.
252
 
The FTC and WP29 are mostly in agreement on this point.  The 
FTC has incorporated data collection and retention into its “privacy 
by design” principle.253  It recommended that companies only collect 
as much data as consumers expect based on their services.
254
  Any 
additional collection should be accompanied by a separate, timely, 
and conspicuous disclosure (in addition to the regular privacy 
policy).
255
  The FTC further recommended that companies delete or 
anonymize data after it has served its initial purpose.
256
  The FTC 
invited industry groups to come up with reasonable retention periods 
for different businesses.
257
  It noted specifically that companies 
collecting location data—like real-time identification or geolocation 
apps—should delete that data early.258  The FTC also encouraged the 
development of “eraser button[s]” to allow consumers to directly 
delete the data that they upload.
259
  To be effective, the buttons need 
to actually delete data from companies’ databases and not only from 
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the consumer-facing side of the product.
260
  Today, deleting a photo in 
Facebook does not necessarily protect a user from being identified 
with real-time identification apps because the photo is only removed 
from the user’s profile and it may not be deleted from Facebook’s 
database until 90 days after the user completely deletes her profile.
261
 
Consistent with its general privacy framework, the FTC’s report 
on face recognition recommended that companies develop retention 
policies for photo and biometric data.
262
  Photos and biometric data 
should only be retained while needed to provide the relevant 
service.
263
  So, if a user deletes her account or turns off the face 
recognition function, the data is obviously no longer needed.
264
  As an 
example, the FTC cited the face recognition feature in the Google+ 
social network, which deletes all biometric data once a user 
withdraws her opt-in consent to use the feature.
265
 
The WP29 opinion, for its part, applied the minimal collection 
principle found in the EU Data Protection Directive to automatic face 
recognition.
266
  It stated that apps should collect the minimal amount 
of biometrics necessary to carry out the service.
267
  It also noted that 
data must be deleted once it is not necessary for the purpose for which 
it was collected, such as when the only purpose of the face 
recognition was to identify the individual to determine if she 
previously consented to the use of her data.
268
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It is clear that American and European regulators alike are 
thinking about data minimization with respect to automatic face 
recognition.  Companies would do best to adopt data retention 
policies early before they become overwhelmed by data that they 
collect.  Avoiding unnecessary collection and retention will not only 
protect consumers from misuse within companies, but will also 
prevent misuse by third parties if there is a security breach and make 
it easier for companies to respond to law enforcement requests. 
E. Think About the Context and User Experience Design 
Real-time identification based on photos uploaded to a social 
network or otherwise available online presents a conceptual problem 
for our traditional understanding of privacy.  Even though many 
would consider real-time identification of people in photographs 
posted online to be a privacy violation, traditionally, those photos 
would not qualify as secret information or information found in a 
completely private space.
269
  One privacy theory that can address this 
issue is Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity.270  I have 
previously applied this theory to explain the controversy surrounding 
the use of face recognition in social networks.
271
  Essentially, that 
scenario violates contextual integrity by transforming information that 
users share through photos, to personally identifying biometric data 
and sharing the information with new recipients beyond users’ 
control.
272
  Real-time identification exacerbates this problem by using 
information shared in an online context to identify individuals in an 
offline context.  It can link various online actions to an otherwise 
anonymous face.  Offline, it can also use biometric data to determine 
the location of an individual.  There are thus two transformations of 
information: from photos to biometric data and, ultimately, to location 
data.  The transformations evidence “a prima facie violation of 
contextual integrity,” which can only be overcome if the practice 
advances an important social concern.
273
  This contextual analysis 
should be taken into account when designing a service to avoid 
abusing users’ trust. 
The FTC has also adopted something resembling Nissenbaum’s 
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contextual analysis in its new recommended business practices for 
consumer privacy: 
Companies should limit data collection to that which is consistent 
with the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s 
relationship with the business, or as required or specifically 
authorized by law. For any data collection that is inconsistent with 
these contexts, companies should make appropriate disclosures to 
consumers at a relevant time and in a prominent manner – outside 
of a privacy policy or other legal document.
274
 
Similarly, the FTC has emphasized the scope of a transaction’s 
context when discussing notice and consent for face recognition 
processes.  It noted, for example, that automatic face recognition is 
inconsistent with the context of a social network.
275
  A social network 
should therefore separately notify its users if it decides to start using 
photos to automatically identify faces.
276
  When it cannot provide 
notice to individuals—perhaps because they do not use the social 
network—it should not use labeled photos of them to create a 
biometric database.
277
  The separate notice must be accompanied by a 
conspicuous ability to opt-out and a mechanism that deletes all photos 
and biometric data once a user opts-out.
278
  I would argue that opt-out 
choice—however conspicuous—is not sufficient to protect against 
extra-contextual face recognition.  Opt-out settings are notoriously 
underutilized, particularly by children.
279
  Given that users upload 
photos to social networks with the particular purpose of socializing 
with their friends, specific opt-in consent should be required before 
using them in this vastly different manner. 
The FTC’s attention to the context of transactions is similar to 
the WP29’s consideration of the main purpose of an application when 
determining whether separate user consent is necessary.
280
  Both are 
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examples of a general trend towards focusing on users’ experience of 
transactions, rather than written privacy policies.
281
  Developers can 
influence the user experience through product design—effectively 
creating a desired context.  User experience design instinctively 
makes a user aware of data collection without the need to read or 
understand a privacy policy.  It can also provide notice to individuals 
beyond the primary user of a product.  For example, a camera can 
produce a shutter sound or a flash that tells a person that she is being 
photographed.
282
  Similarly, security cameras are sometimes equipped 
with a screen showing customers that they are being recorded in real 
time instead of posting a “smile, you’re on camera” notice next to the 
camera.
283
  One could imagine a real-time identification app in a 
phone or a pair of computer glasses that loudly announces the name 
of a recognized subject, putting her on notice that she is identified and 
perhaps allowing her to prevent an embarrassing photo from being 
posted to her social network profile.  While the exact implementation 
of such a feature might vary, the general idea of notifying subjects 
when recognized is a palpable example of privacy protective user 
experience design.
284
  An alternative design would be an app that 
allows each user to compile a biometric database specific to an 
individual device.  Each user would then only be able to recognize 
individuals that appear in her own user-generated database.
285
  The 
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design would play on people’s expectations that a person they interact 
with may remember them next time, no matter how brief the initial 
interaction.  To maximize innovation in privacy design, regulation 
should not try to mandate any particular design like a camera shutter 
sound,
286
 but should instead leave it to developers to come up with 
effective solutions to the third-party notice problem.
287
 
CONCLUSION 
Although face recognition technology has been evolving for 
decades, its policy ramifications remained largely unexplored.  The 
recent implementation of the technology into consumer applications 
provoked rapid policy responses.  These responses, however, did not 
comprehensively address real-time identification.  The FTC report on 
face recognition technology, in particular, implied that real-time 
identification apps were yet to hit the market and provided some 
preliminary recommendations of what such apps should avoid.
288
 
In reality, however, real-time identification apps are already on 
sale and call for us to begin thinking about when and how their use 
may be inappropriate.  While these apps resemble mobile apps that 
use geolocation data, real-time identification apps raise additional 
issues because they collect location information about third parties 
and are capable of identifying anonymous faces in the street.  The 
regulatory solutions that are being developed for geolocation apps—
such as shorter privacy notices for mobile screens and just-in-time 
disclosures to users—will therefore not work for real-time 
identification. 
As the FTC will inevitably have to review real-time 
identification apps, it would do well to focus on this particular use 
rather than seeking to address it along with other face recognition 
applications.  That will ensure technology neutral regulation that 
addresses the specific issues raised by real-time identification and that 
will apply to similar uses in the future without affecting vastly 
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different uses of face recognition technology.  With respect to the 
apps available today, the policy response should consider how 
relevant individuals could be put on notice, given that these apps 
affect other individuals in addition to the app user.  The policy 
response will also need to consider how these apps can minimize their 
data collection and retention and keep the data secure.  Importantly, 
the policy will also need to consider the initial context in which the 
data is collected—particularly given that today’s apps take advantage 
of photos that people share with their friends in social networks.  
Future real-time identification apps may raise additional issues 
because of their design, which will need to be addressed at that time.  
This should not stop us from getting the ball rolling. 
